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HOW AN UNSURPASSABLE BEING 
CAN CREATE A SURPASSABLE WORLD 
Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder 
This seems coherent: a morally unsurpassable and omnipotent being (Jove) 
is faced with a choice of which world to actualize where for any he might 
actualize there is a better. He creates a device that randomly selects from 
amongst the worlds he can actualize. The world that is chosen is, of course, 
surpassable, and yet, he seems not. We defend this conclusion against three 
versions of the claim that since someone could produce a world which sur-
passed Jove's, that being could morally surpass Jove. The first is that a 
superior being confronted with Jove's choice would not create at all; the 
second is that he would use Jove's device and it would select a superior world; 
the third is that he would create a superior world without using Jove's device. 
We argue that none of these ways of behaving would show that he was 
morally superior to Jove. 
Imagine that there exists a good, essentially omniscient and omnipotent being 
named Jove, and that there exists nothing else. No possible being is more 
powerful or knowledgeable. Out of his goodness, Jove decides to create. 
Since he is all-powerful, there is nothing but the bounds of possibility to 
prevent him from getting what he wants. Unfortunately, as he holds before 
his mind the host of worlds, Jove sees that for each there is a better one. 
Although he can create any of them, he can't create the best of them because 
there is no best. Faced with this predicament, Jove first sorts the worlds according 
to certain criteria. For example, he puts on his left worlds in which some inhabi-
tants live lives that aren't worth living and on his right worlds in which every 
inhabitant's life is worth living; he puts on his left worlds in which some horrors 
fail to serve an outweighing good and on his right worlds in which no horror 
fails to serve an outweighing good. CWe encourage the reader to use her own 
criteria.) Then he orders the right hand worlds according to their goodness and 
assigns to each a positive natural number, the worst of the lot receiving '1,' the 
second worst '2,' and so on. Next, he creates a very intricate device that, at the 
push of a button, will randomly select a number and produce the corresponding 
world. Jove pushes the button; the device hums and whirs and, finally, its digital 
display reads '777': world no. 777 comes into being. 
We see no incoherence in this story. Now, consider the proposition that 
Jove is not only good but essentially unsurpassably good. Suppose we add 
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this to our story. Does some glaring incoherence reveal itself? We can't see 
one. If our story (so amended) is a logical possibility, then there is no con-
tradiction in supposing that an essentially morally unsurpassable, essentially 
omnipotent and omniscient being could create a world inferior to some other 
world he, or some other possible being, could have created. 
It is important to see that our (amended) story does not merely suggest that 
Jove is not at fault in creating a world less than the best he could have created. 
It suggests much more than that an essentially omnipotent and omniscient 
being does nothing wrong in creating a surpassable world. It suggests that 
his creating a world inferior to one he or some other possible being could 
have created does nothing to impugn his status as essentially morally unsur-
passable in any respect whatsoever. And so we claim that if any philosophical 
story can illustrate a logical possibility, our story illustrates how it is possible 
for an essentially morally unsurpassable, essentially omnipotent and omnis-
cient being to create a surpassable world. l 
We expect some people to disagree with us. We expect they will say things 
like this: 
An omnipotent being can actualize any actualizable world. If he actualizes 
one than which there is a morally better, he does not do the best he can, 
morally speaking, and so it is possible that there is an agent morally better 
than he is, namely, an omnipotent moral agent who actualizes one of those 
morally better worlds;2 
or perhaps this: 
A being is necessarily an absolutely perfect moral being only if it is not 
possible for there to be a being morally better than it. If a being creates a 
world when there is some morally better world that it could have created, 
then it is possible that there be a being morally better than it. For it would 
be possible for there to be a omnipotent being who creates a better world that 
the first being could create but did not. 3 
Apparently, these people assume that, if it is possible for there to be an 
omnipotent being who when faced with Jove's predicament creates a better 
world, then-so long as nothing else about him made him morally worse than 
Jove4-, he would be morally better than Jove. If they don't assume this, then 
even if it is possible for there to be such an omnipotent being, that would 
hardly suffice to show that Jove was morally surpassable. Therefore, the 
possibility of an omnipotent being creating a better world than Jove created 
shows that Jove is morally surpassable only if his creating a better world 
shows he is, ceteris paribus, morally better than Jove. So, to judge whether 
the possibility in question shows that Jove is morally surpassable, we must 
reflect on the ways in which an omnipotent being could behave differently 
from Jove and ask regarding each, "All else being equal, would his behaving 
like that demonstrate he was morally better than Jove?" 
262 Faith and Philosophy 
We shall sketch three ways in which an omnipotent being could behave 
differently from Jove and argue that in each case the being in question is 
clearly no morally better. 
1 
The first suggestion is the simplest: if an omnipotent being were faced with 
Jove's choice and did not create at all, then, ceteris paribus, he would be 
morally better than Jove. 
Before we evaluate this alternative, two preliminaries are in order. First, 
we have been speaking as if Jove created a possible world. This is not strictly 
true. Possible worlds are necessarily existing abstract entities that have their 
being independently of anyone's creative activity. So Jove doesn't create a 
possible world; he creates individuals and in so doing brings it about that one 
of the infinitely many existing possible worlds is the actual world. Secondly, 
Jove doesn't have the option of making it the case that there is no actual 
world. There must be some actual world, and it is up to Jove which it is. If 
Jove lies back and plays dead, if he refrains from using his creative powers, 
a world will nevertheless be actual and it will be his responsibility. That world 
will have no concrete being other than Jove in it. Call any world in which 
there is nothing other than its creator in it a virtually empty world. 
With these points in mind, consider the proposition that if an omnipotent 
being were faced with Jove's predicament and refrained from creating, he 
would be morally better. Is this true? Let an Adams world be a world in which 
every creature is at least as happy on the whole as it could be and in which 
no creature has a life so miserable on the whole that it would have been better 
had it never existed.' Nothing in our story about Jove rules out the possibility 
that all the worlds at Jove's right hand are Adams worlds. So consider this 
question: would an omnipotent being faced with a choice between actualizing 
a virtually empty world and an Adams world demonstrate that he was morally 
better than Jove if he created nothing? 
We believe not. For, first of all, while there is nothing to recommend a 
virtually empty world over an Adams world, there is much to recommend an 
Adams world over a virtually empty world. Secondly, and perhaps a bit more 
contentiously, it is not possible for a morally unsurpassable creator to actu-
alize the virtually empty world. Whatever else may characterize moral un-
surpassibility, love does, and it is not possible to exhibit the best sort of 
love if there is no one else around. Thus, since a morally unsurpassable 
being would surely prefer to exhibit his love rather than not, he would be 
constrained by his nature to create an Adams world over a virtually empty 
one. And so we conclude that if an omnipotent being faced with Jove's 
predicament did not create, it's false that he would be morally better than 
Jove. 
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We imagined that Jove used the randomizer and world no. 777 was the result. 
Now imagine a world in which an omnipotent being, call her Juno, constructs 
and uses an exact replica of Jove's randomizer but, because it churns out 
number 999, a better world than Jove's is actualized. Ceteris paribus, does 
Juno's using the device to produce world no. 999 show that she is morally 
better than Jove? 
Of course not. Factors outside of one's control can make a difference to 
how much good one brings about without making a difference to how good 
one is. Jove has no control over what number his randomizer will deliver. 
Thus, given his resolve to let the device do its thing, it is not up to him which 
of the worlds to his right is actualized. And precisely the same can be said 
about Juno. Thus, even if a better world results from Juno's using the device, 
that's no reason to infer that she is morally better than Jove. 
Perhaps it will be objected that as a society we punish the drunk driver who 
hits and kills a child more severely than we punish the drunk driver who gets 
home safely, even if we think that it was a matter of sheer luck that the second 
got home safely and the first did not. If this response is rational, one might 
infer that the first driver did greater wrong and, hence, is a worse person than 
the second driver. One might be tempted to generalize that if factors outside 
one's control make a difference to how much good one brings about, then 
they make a difference to how good one is. In that case, the objection goes, 
we should infer that Jove is a worse person than Juno after all. 
Philosophers disagree over whether the first driver did something wrong 
that the second driver did not do. We shan't get bogged down in that debate. 
But even granting that the first driver did do something wrong that the second 
driver did not, clearly it is a mistake to infer that, for this reason alone, the 
first is a worse person than the second. To think otherwise is like supposing 
that if Jeffrey Dahmer had been caught and brought to trial in 1985 and thus 
had slain fewer boys, he would have been a better person; it is like supposing 
that if Mother Teresa had been assassinated in 1990 and thus had cared for 
fewer destitute people, she would have been a worse person. A more plausible 
view is that while it is appropriate to punish the first driver more severely 
for the extra wrong (we are supposing) he did, we oughtn't to infer that he 
is a worse person. 
3 
Suppose we agree that, ceteris paribus, Jove and Juno are morally equivalent. 
"Nevertheless," you might insist, "Jove is morally surpassable. For imagine 
Thor, a possible omnipotent being who faces Jove's choice. Instead of con-
structing and using a randomizer to select which of the infinitely many pro-
gressively better worlds to actualize, Thor actualizes world no. 888 without 
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using a randomizer. Surely, Thor in world no. 888 is morally better than Jove 
in world no. 777 and hence Jove is morally surpassable." 
But is it true that, if an omnipotent being in Jove's predicament created a 
better world without using an indeterministic device, then, ceteris paribus, 
he would be morally better than Jove? In what would that betterness consist? 
Obviously it would not consist in the fact that Thor actualized a better world 
than Jove. For given that Jove and Juno are morally equivalent, if Thor is 
better than Jove, then he's better than Juno; but the world Thor actualizes is 
inferior to the world Juno actualizes. So if Thor is better than Jove, it must 
be in virtue of some other difference between them. Perhaps the crucial 
difference is a difference in attitude. For example, one might urge that there 
is a significant moral difference between a creator who, faced with Jove's 
choice, settles for letting some random occurrence determine which world he 
creates and a creator who, faced with the same choice, deliberately picks a 
specific world for some reason. This line of thought seems quite plausible 
when we consider human analogies. Imagine a parent trying to decide what 
school to send her son to. We'd surely think better of her if she picked a 
particular school on the basis of its comparative merits rather then leaving 
the matter to chance, which seems uncaring at worst and insufficiently atten-
tive at best. In a similar fashion, we might imagine Thor considering whether 
to create world no. 777, and then noticing out of the corner of his mind's eye 
world no. 888 and, seeing that it is better, reasoning as follows: "World no. 
888 is better than world no. 777 and, surely, it's preferable to actualize a 
better world if I can." And so Thor doesn't settle for world no. 777 and 
actualizes world no. 888 instead. 
But this difference between Thor and Jove does not show that Thor is 
morally better than Jove. To see why, suppose that prior to constructing the 
randomizer, Jove reasoned like this: "World no. 888 is better than world no. 
777 and, surely, it's preferable to actualize a better world if I can. And world 
no. 999 is better than world no. 888. Surely it's preferable to actualize a better 
world if I can. And world no. 1099 is ... hold on here! If I keep this up, I'll 
actualize a virtually empty world. Perhaps I should create an indeterministic 
device that. .. " The rest of the story has already been told. The important point 
to see here is that given a choice between infinitely many progressively better 
worlds to actualize, Jove wisely rejects Thor's principle that ifthere's a better 
world than w, don't create w, not because he is casual or uncaring or objec-
tionably settling for less, but because that principle in that context would lead 
him (and Thor, were he rational) to do nothing, which is far worse than using 
the randomizer. 
Perhaps there is some other relevant difference between Thor and Jove that 
would make Thor morally better than Jove. For example, one might note that 
we have assumed that the only reason Thor might have for picking world no. 
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888 over another is that the former is better than the latter. But there are 
plenty of other considerations that might constitute Thor's reason for picking 
no. 888. Thus, on this retelling of the story, Thor decides on his own for a 
reason to create some particular world whereas Jove allows something else 
to make the decision for him. In that case Jove, unlike Thor, abdicates his 
status as rational agent in the creative process and is therefore worse than 
Thor.6 By way of reply, note that by creating the indeterministic device Jove 
does decide on his own for a reason to produce some world or other; he does 
not abdicate his status as a rational agent. Perhaps the objector will say that 
Thor is more rational than Jove in virtue of narrowing down the options to 
one. But this is an illusion. Thor is not better qua rational agent than Jove 
since on this retelling of the story Thor selects world no. 888 not because of 
its goodness but because he simply prefers it, say, because it has simpler laws 
or lots of waterfalls and jagged peaks and he likes those things. But having 
and acting on such preferences is not enough to make Thor more rational than 
Jove. 
4 
We have considered three ways an omnipotent being might behave differently 
than Jove: 
i. Do nothing. 
ii. Use Jove's randomizing procedure to produce a better world. 
iii. Use a non-randomizing procedure to produce a better world. 
In each case we've seen that Jove is not morally worse. 
There are other ways in which an omnipotent being could behave in Jove's 
predicament. But those we can think of are either just plain silly or subject 
to objections we've raised regarding (i), (ii) and (iii). An instance of the 
second sort is this: suppose an omnipotent being creates a better world using 
a randomizing procedure different than the one Jove used. For example, 
imagine Jac, an omnipotent being who believes that if he guarantees that 
some worse right hand worlds are not actualized, he would be morally better 
than one who could but didn't guarantee this. Thus, instead of using Jove's 
procedure, Jac might first "halve" the right hand worlds then use the random-
izer to produce one of those worlds in the right half. The problem with this 
procedure is that if Jac has enough reason to halve at all, he has enough reason 
to halve again, and again, and again, and a virtually empty world threatens. 
To avoid this result, one might recommend to J ac that he first use the ran-
domizer to select a number of halvings, then, after reassigning integers to the 
remaining worlds, use it once more to pick which of the remainder to actu-
alize. But this doesn't help. If Jac has enough reason to use the device 
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twice-first to halve the worlds on his right and second to select a particular 
world to actualize-, then he has enough reason to use the device three 
times-first to halve the worlds on his right, second to multiply that number 
by another randomly selected number and third to select a particular world 
to actualize. And if he has enough reason to use the device three times, he 
has enough reason to use it four times ... and we're off to the races. Far from 
guaranteeing that worse right hand worlds aren't actualized, the recom-
mended reasoning leads to a virtually empty world. 
We'd like to consider one more objection.7 Presumably there are many 
different randomizers which Jove might have used to pick a world to create. 
Let RI stand for the device Jove actually used, and let R2 to Rn stand for 
the others. Now, one might argue that if Jove is omniscient, then he would 
know, for any of RI to Rn, which world it would select if he were to create 
that device. So, prior to making RI, he knew that, if he made RI, it would select 
world no. 777. Now, suppose he also knew that one of the other randomizers, 
say, R2, would select a world better than no. 777, and that no randomizer would 
in fact select a world better than the one selected by R2. Wouldn't we then have 
sufficient grounds to infer Jove was morally surpassable? 
That all depends. Suppose there are no truths about which world a random-
izer would select were it created. Then Jove wouldn't know for any device 
which world it would select. So we would not on these grounds rightly infer 
Jove's moral surpassability. But suppose Jove does have the knowledge in 
question. Still, we ought not to think less of Jove. After all, for all we know 
the randomizer Jove uses selects a better world than any other randomizer 
would select. Of course, for all we know, there is no best randomizer because it 
could be that for any device he might create, there is another he could have 
created which would have selected a better world than the first one would select. 
Should we think less of Jove for not creating the best randomizer in that case? 
No. But countenancing infinitely many randomizers raises a related worry. 
If Jove thinks that the best way to produce a world is to construct a random-
izer, then surely he'd think that the best way to select a randomizer would 
be to construct a randomizer to pick one. An infinite regress looms. Of course, 
Jove would have the same sort of reason for ending this infinite regress as 
he would for creating the device in the first place. Perhaps he would arbitrar-
ily pick some device, for no reason at all, save that some device has to be 
chosen in order to avoid a virtually empty world. 
We imagine our reader will ask: if Jove can do that, why can't he just pick 
some world arbitrarily without creating a randomizer in the first place? That's 
a good question. And here we remove our mask. The randomizer has served 
its purpose: had Jove just up and created world no. 777 in the scenario 
originally described, so doing would not have reflected badly on him in any 
way at all. 
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Perhaps there are ways we haven't thought of in which an omnipotent being 
could behave differently from Jove. There's always that danger to beware of 
in drawing inferences over a territory whose boundaries are not clearly dis-
cernible. But our hunch is that they too will be like the cases we have 
considered. If our hunch is correct, then Jove nicely illustrates how an un-
surpassable being can create a surpassable world. 
This consequence should be of some interest to those who, imbued with 
the spirit of Anselm, are tempted to believe propositions like these: 
Q. Necessarily, for any w, w' and x, if w is an actualizable world and w' is 
an actualizable world and w is a morally better world than w', then if x 
is an omnipotent moral agent and x actualizes w', then x is such that there 
is some possible world in which there is a y such that y is a better moral 
agent in that world than x is in w'. 
R. If a being creates a world when there is a morally better world that it could 
have created, then it is possible that there exists a morally better being 
than it.s 
And it should be of special interest to those who are further tempted to think 
that "on the supposition that for every creatable world there is another world 
that is better than it, ... principle [R] leads to the conclusion that there is no 
essentially omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being."9 Although what we 
have said may not be sufficient to reject Q and R outright, we certainly hope, 
by Jove, that it is enough to help those so tempted to resist believing them.10 
NOTES 
Seattle Pacific University 
Western Washington University 
I. Of course, we have represented Jove as being spatially located, as being both 
omniscient and coming to learn things, and as having a choice about whether to create 
worlds that an essentially morally unsurpassable being could not create, i.e., those on the 
left hand side. Moreover, we have assumed that the ranking Jove gives the right hand 
worlds does not permit ties and that there wouldn't be so many worlds that they couldn't 
be mapped one-to-one to the positive natural numbers. And we have left untold the inner 
workings of the randomizing device. We invite the fastidious reader to retell our story in 
such a way as to avoid these mundane infelicities. 
2. See Philip Quinn, "God, Moral Perfection, and Possible Worlds," in God: The 
Contemporary Discussion, edited by Frederick Sontag and M. Darrol Bryant (New York: 
The Rose of Sharon Press, 1982), p. 213. 
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3. This is, virtually, what William Rowe writes in ''The Problem of Divine Perfection 
and Freedom," in Reasoned Faith (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), edited 
by Eleonore Stump, p. 8 and pp. 10-11. 
4. Hereafter, we shall either leave this qualification tacit or use "ceteris paribus" as a 
reminder. 
5. See Robert M. Adams, "Must God Create the Best?," in The Virtue of Faith and Other 
Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 53. 
6. We are grateful to Thomas Flint for this objection: 
7. The discussion of the next three paragraphs is almost entirely due to comments we 
received from Flint. 
8. See the previously cited essays by Quinn and Rowe. 
9. We think here of William Rowe, in an amended later version of the previously cited 
essay. 
10. We are grateful to five people: William Rowe, for his interest and invaluable input; 
Philip Quinn, for conversation, correspondence and encouragement; Jan A. Cover, for 
Sunday afternoon (and, no, we refuse to add that craziness about creating all the worlds); 
Peter van Inwagen: for the conceptual space provided by "The Place of Chance in a World 
Sustained by God"; and Thomas Flint, for comments which in substance and spirit are an 
example par excellence of how refereeing should be done. 
